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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a Bayesian framework for evaluative classification. Current 
education policy debates center on arguments about whether and how to use student 
test score data in school and personnel evaluation. Proponents of such use argue that 
refusing to use data violates both the public’s need to hold schools accountable when 
they use taxpayer dollars and students’ right to educational opportunities. Opponents of 
formulaic use of test-score data argue that most standardized test data is susceptible to 
fatal technical flaws, is a partial picture of student achievement, and leads to behavior 
that corrupts the measures. A Bayesian perspective on summative ordinal classification 
is a possible framework for combining quantitative outcome data for students with the 
qualitative types of evaluation that critics of high-stakes testing advocate. This paper 
describes the key characteristics of a Bayesian perspective on classification, describes a 
method to translate a naïve Bayesian classifier into a point-based system for evaluation, 
and draws conclusions from the comparison on the construction of algorithmic 
(including point-based) systems that could capture the political and practical benefits of 
a Bayesian approach. The most important practical conclusion is that point-based 
systems with fixed components and weights cannot capture the dynamic and political 
benefits of a reciprocal relationship between professional judgment and quantitative 
student outcome data.  
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“Use It or Lose It” Professional Judgment: 
Educational Evaluation and Bayesian Reasoning 
 
On July 24, 2009, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan announced draft regulations for state applications for “Race to the Top” funds 
appropriated by Congress in early 2009 (Branigin, 2009). Among the draft 
requirements for state applicants was the elimination of so-called legislative and 
regulatory “firewalls” between student-outcome data and teacher records. The assertive 
rhetoric from Obama administration appointees clearly implies that the current 
administration will push states to use student outcome data in teacher evaluation. While 
most of the public discussion of and controversy surrounding such data use has focused 
on performance-pay policies  (e.g., Azordegan, Byrnett, Campbell, Greenman, & Coulter, 
2005; Behrstock & Akerstrom, 2008; Max & Koppich, 2007), the most consequential 
potential use of student outcome data is for questions of employment—whether and to 
what extent test-score and other outcome data will influence the ordinary evaluation 
and continuation of teacher employment, tenure, and intervention efforts (Baratz-
Snowden, 2009; Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009).  
In the past decade, arguments about test-score use have focused on the No Child 
Left Behind Act’s cruder mechanisms for labeling schools, either arguments in favor of 
formulaic triggers as essential public-policy tools to equalize opportunity or arguments 
that such triggers are inherently corrupting (e.g., Dorn, 2007; Nichols & Berliner, 2007). 
Similar arguments inevitably surround the use of test-score and other student outcome 
data for personnel evaluation purposes, but with additional issues: the attribution of 
outcomes to single teachers, the omission of many educators by default when 
assessments only exist for a small part of the curriculum, and a recent technical 
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literature emphasizing the difficulty of identifying anything more than a small portion of 
teachers as outliers (as either effective or ineffective) through test-score data (e.g., 
Baratz-Snowden, 2009; Lockwood, Louis, & McCaffrey, 2002).  
While Duncan has made clear that his intent is not to force teacher evaluation 
decisions to revolve entirely around test scores, the current administration’s position is 
that student outcomes need to figure into evaluation. But how that is done is an open 
question. In Florida, the statutory authorization for the Merit Award Program option for 
school districts requires that student outcome data "shall be weighted at not less than 
60 percent of the overall evaluation" (Florida Statutes 1012.225(3)(c)). The Florida 
legislature mandated one of several options to use in combining quantitative and 
qualitative judgments of teacher effectiveness, the point system. While there are 
variations that meet the statutory language, almost any real-world implementation 
meeting the spirit of the law would almost all be linear combinations of different 
subscores (also see Max, 2007).  
This type of algorithm for combining qualitative professional judgments and 
student outcome data is not the only option for using student outcome data. In 
performance-pay, for example, there exist a small number of programs that include 
student performance as one pathway through which teachers may seek pay increases, as 
in Minneapolis or Denver (Azordegan et al., 2005; Potemski & Rowland, 2009).1
Standardized test scores can play a role in presenting evidence of learning, but 
using standardized test scores as the sole or predominant measure of 
 Baratz-
Snowden (2009) argued that student outcomes should be part of evaluation, but 
without specifying how: 
                                                   
1 Also see the Denver ProComp website at http://denverprocomp.org.  
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achievement is unwarranted and unwise given the inadequacy of such tests to 
capture the complexities and breadth of student learning and the limitations of 
current value-added methodologies. Nonetheless, it is absolutely essential that 
teachers present evidence of student learning—through test results and other 
material—as part of the tenure system if it is to be credible. Calling upon 
experienced teachers to help develop the multiple sources of such evidence is 
essential in redesigning the tenure system. (p. 28) 
 
The evaluation systems she highlighted—in Toledo and Minneapolis’s local public 
school systems and in the Los Angeles Green Dot union contract—are different 
variations of a holistic or portfolio system of teacher evaluation, including requirements 
for documenting both the process and outcomes of professional development.  
Such a holistic system may well be the outcome of proactive collaboration 
between teacher union locals and local school boards, but the history of performance-
pay plans suggests that some states will attempt to impose the type of algorithmic 
requirements for evaluations that Florida’s legislature has created in its performance-
pay statute. In states without collective bargaining or with more legal or practical 
authority for legislatures, local collective bargaining may be less important than the 
political environment at the state level. Legislators who distrust school districts are 
going to be less likely to accept holistic evaluation reviews than district-level 
management with a history of collaborative relationships with unions.  
The differences between holistic and algorithmic use of student outcome data 
include at least two dimensions of the continuing debate over high-stakes testing 
policies. One dimension is the technical adequacy of existing assessments. Advocates of 
an algorithmic approach are likely to argue that current assessments are not perfect but 
are a sufficient basis on which to make decisions. The same recognized flaws of existing 
assessments will probably be the focus of critics of an algorithmic approach (whether or 
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not the critics would accept even a holistic teacher evaluation system that uses student 
outcome data). The critics will continue to argue that tests assess only a small portion of 
the formal curriculum and student performance, and that their use will corrupt the 
measures and teaching practices. Behind the debates about the technical flaws or 
adequacy of existing assessments, however, there is another dimension of the 
discussion, and that is around trust of professional judgment. The arguments of 
Weisberg et al. (2009) feed into the historical dynamic of accountability politics (Dorn, 
2007): policymakers and many citizens distrust either the capacity or willingness of 
educators to make appropriate judgments about school practices and teacher 
performance. Reciprocating this lack of trust, many teachers believe that state 
legislators and advocates of high-stakes testing use testing as a tool with which to attack 
public schools and teachers.  
Unless addressing trust and mistrust is central to the design of teacher evaluation 
systems, the evaluation policies that develop in response to criticism of current practices 
are likely to be unsatisfactory to the two sides of the debate over test-score use. Many 
school critics are wary of evaluation policies that leave open the possibility of evaluation 
systems that never identify weak teachers, and an algorithmic approach such as the one 
mandated for Florida’s Merit Award Program is likely to appeal to such critics. But an 
algorithmic approach will be unsatisfactory to those who distrust the use of tests to drive 
decisionmaking in schools.  
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Bayesian Perspectives on Classification 
Resolving the trust problem in teacher evaluation requires stepping back to ask 
what we are seeking: sound decisions about whether teachers should continue without 
intervention, should be given additional professional assistance, or should leave the 
field. Making those decisions with confidence should be goal of a teacher evaluation 
system, decisions that are far more likely to be right than wrong. There is one 
algorithmic approach that could be promising, or at least a foundation for thinking 
about how to combine qualitative professional judgment and quantitative data in ways 
that focus on making critical personnel decisions, give significant weight to professional 
judgment when it is made, and leaves a safety valve for decisionmaking when 
supervisors (and peers, in peer-review systems) are unwilling to make hard decisions 
about teachers. One can use Bayesian reasoning to understand evaluative classification 
as a process of judgments reshaped with data. This section describes Bayes’ Theorem on 
the calculation of conditional probabilities, a possible translation of that use in 
personnel and program evaluation, and some of the general political and technical 
issues involved in translating Bayes’ Theorem into evaluation use.  
Bayes’ Theorem and Conditional Probability 
The standard presentation of Bayes’ theorem centers on the conditional 
probability of A given data x, or P(A|x), 
 (1) 
where P(A) is the general probability of A, P(x) is the general probability of x, and P(x|A) 
is the conditional probability of observing x given A (also called the likelihood of 
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observing x given A).2 Equation (1) is the most common form of Bayes’ Theorem, and it 
captures the relationship among four components of conditional probability. With 
complete information, one can see Bayes’ Theorem in action. For example, if one 
examines the 1785 public elementary schools in Florida which received a letter grade 
from the state in June 2009, what is the probability of receiving a letter grade of “A” if 
the percentage of tested students meeting the state’s standards on the reading test was 
exactly 50%?3
                                                   
2 The appendix contains a more technical discussion of Bayesian reasoning, the naïve Bayesian classifier, 
and a translation to an additive point system.  
 Here, almost 71% of all public elementary schools in Florida received an 
“A” from the state, 0.08% of “A”-labeled schools had exactly 50% of all participating 
students meeting the state’s standards on reading tests, and 0.56% of all schools had 
50% of students meeting state standards, or 
. 
This claimed is validated by inspection of the records: 10 public elementary schools in 
Florida had 50% of all students meeting state standards in the spring 2009 tests, and 
one such school (or 10%) received an “A” from the state in summer 2009. (Out of all 
Florida elementary schools receiving an “A,” Liberty City Elementary School in Miami 
had the lowest proportion of students at or above the state reading test cut score in 
spring exams.) A similar exercise with the set of all public elementary schools having 
50% or more students passing state standards in 2009 (1723 schools, a set that 
contained all 1261 elementary schools receiving an “A” from the state in 2009) will show 
that 73.2% of such schools received a letter grade of “A.” 
3 For letter grades assigned Florida’s public schools, see http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org.  
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With complete data, Bayes’ theorem is an accounting exercise. But an accounting 
exercise is not the value of Bayes’ theorem. The general value of conditional probability 
is the ability to reason consistently about incomplete information. The evaluation of 
medical test results is the most common example of this use (perhaps because test 
results are often evaluated with the wrong perspective). If someone tests positive for a 
rare condition—for example, if the probability of having the condition is 1 in 10,000—
even a highly accurate test can generally be wrong, even where 95% of those with the 
condition have a positive test, and only 5% of those without the condition test positive. 
Here, we break down P(x) into the sum of the probability of testing positive for those 
with the disease (A) and the probability of those testing positive without the disease 
(~A): 
. 
The result is counterintuitive to many: a test with 95% accuracy in two dimensions is 
going to be wrong for the vast majority of positive results from a population where the 
risk is extremely low. Because the prevalence of a condition can dominate the value of a 
test result, repeating tests (or testing split samples) is important to provide confidence 
about the interpretation of positive test results for rare conditions.  
Bayes and Inductive Reasoning 
A minority of statisticians and a number of philosophers of science push a 
Bayesian approach in a different direction; in one Bayesian perspective, P(A) could be 
the general probability of A, but it can also be the judgment of the probability of A 
before gathering data, or the prior probability. In this view, P(A|x) is the posterior 
probability of A after gathering data x. This approach combines a prior judgment of A 
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(which could be based on qualitative judgments) with data collection and analysis. In a 
Bayesian perspective, the data updates (or bumps) one’s prior judgment. Bayesian 
advocates argue that this is consistent with the scientific method (Howson & Urbach, 
2005). Those skeptical of a Bayesian approach with a subjective prior often argue that 
the inclusion of subjective judgment in a prior probability is not objective; subjective 
Bayesians often respond that the priors always exist, and a subjective Bayesian approach 
merely reveals those choices in an explicit fashion.  
There is little literature attempting to apply a Bayesian approach to program or 
personnel evaluation in education, either the ordinary meaning of conditional 
probability or the subjectivist Bayesian approach.4
Bayesian Reasoning and Evaluation Policy 
 The social-science field with 
experience in applying a Bayesian reasoning to conditional probability is in law, where 
there is a small literature on discussing statistics with juries (e.g., Kaye, 1999; Lindsey, 
Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2003). Some litigators have an incentive to avoid juries’ 
inappropriately applying conditional probability in a manner known in legal circles as 
the prosecutor’s fallacy—confusing the probability of testing positive given a hypothesis 
with the probability of the hypothesis being true given a positive test (e.g., Fenton & 
Neil, 2000).  
The current policy debate over teacher evaluation provides an important reason 
to consider the use of a Bayesian approach, an approach with both practical and political 
benefits. For these purposes, the most important characteristic of the standard equation 
                                                   
4 See Wood (1972) for a book review of Bayesian arguments at a Phi Delta Kappan symposium, with 
subjective Bayesian reasoning apparently considered more charming than practical by Wood.  
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for a posterior probability is the relationship between the prior probability and the 
likelihood: a forceful statement of prior probability is bumped less by any given data 
than a weaker statement of prior probability.5
                                                   
5 In the long run, data will dominate both a frequentist and a Bayesian’s estimation of relevant quantities. 
But we generally do not live in an asymptotic world, especially with regard to personnel evaluation.  
 For classification purposes, one would 
compare the probability of being in two different groups, or the odds. For example, 
consider an evaluation system that uses principal or peer judgment, and a teacher where 
both the school principal and peers think the teacher could use intervention but are not 
entirely certain. If the professional judgment before gathering additional data is that the 
teacher is somewhat more likely to need intervention than not—odds of 3:2, or a 
professional judgment that 60% of teachers in similar situations and with similar 
information available to administrators and teachers would need remediation—how 
could additional data update that professional judgment? The key term is a likelihood 
ratio—for a choice between one decision and another (for example, deciding whether a 
teacher needs help with instruction), the ratio of the likelihood of seeing a data pattern 
under one hypothesis (for example, intervening with a teacher) against the likelihood of 
seeing the same data pattern under the competing hypothesis (not intervening). After 
gathering additional data—and again assuming that the data is professionally relevant 
and the relevant likelihood functions are salient—assume that the principal and peers 
discover that 6% of teachers judged as needing remediation produce the data gathered 
and that 1% of teachers judged as not needing remediation produce the data gathered. 
The likelihood ratio is 6:1, and the posterior (after-data-gathering) odds of needing 
intervention then become  9:1, or a 90% posterior probability of needing remediation. 
But the data can also bump the prior judgment in the other direction. If 6% of teachers 
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judged as needing remediation produce the data gathered but 8% of teachers judged as 
not needing remediation also produce the data gathered, the likelihood ratio is 6:8 (or 
3:4), and the posterior (after-data-gathering) odds of needing intervention then become  
9:8, or an only slightly greater than even odds (approximately 53% probability) of 
needing intervention.   
In the hypothetical cases described above, data can help one update the prior 
judgment, and data can bump the prior judgment in different directions. But there is 
another important characteristic of posterior odds: the forcefulness of the prior odds 
also shape the posterior judgment. A forceful statement of prior relative odds (e.g., a 
prior judgment that the teacher is twice as likely to need intervention as not) would be 
bumped less by any given data than a weaker statement of prior relative odds (e.g., a 
prior judgment that the teacher is equally likely to need intervention as not). If a 
school’s culture is one where the principal and peers err on the side of nonintervention 
in the case of a weak teacher, then the likelihood ratio would dominate the posterior 
odds. If a principal and peers make forceful judgments about teachers, the data are 
going to be less influential.6
The reciprocal relationship between the influence of prior judgments and the 
influence of data-generated likelihood ratios could well be a practical and political 
strength rather than a liability, including and perhaps especially for those skeptical of 
subjective judgments of teacher effectiveness. A system with a Bayesian rationale for 
combining professional judgment with quantitative data can encourage professional 
 
                                                   
6 As Howson and Urbach (2005) and many others point out, a large amount of data will dominate strong 
prior probabilities. The practical issue here is balancing professional judgment and student outcome data, 
and in many cases the data from a single year will not dominate a prior supplied by a professional 
evaluative rating. 
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judgment by making the judgment more influential where administrators (and peers in 
peer-review systems) make stronger judgments. However, in such a system, 
institutional cultures that avoid forceful professional judgments would be more likely to 
produce weak prior odds that are overridden by likelihood ratios (which data would 
drive). Such systems could satisfy educators’ and teachers unions’ concerns that 
personnel evaluation not rely entirely on test scores, because professional judgment 
would take precedence where it is exercised forcefully. But the ability of data to 
dominate weak prior judgments could also satisfy the concerns of policymakers 
dissatisfied with the unwillingness of administrators to make forceful judgments about 
ineffective teachers. A Bayesian algorithm provides a way out from the trust dilemma 
surrounding professional judgment and teacher evaluation: a “use it or lose it” approach 
to professional judgment is an alternative to either a dominant use of (imperfect) test 
data or a dominant use of (sometimes-reluctant) professional judgment, creating a 
possible operationalization of Shulman’s (1988) marriage of insufficiencies.  
Bayesian classifiers exist in practice, if not in education evaluation, and most of 
us have benefited by experiencing at least one—or rather not being aware of how we are 
benefiting. Most of the statistical research on the characteristics of Bayesian classifiers is 
in the field of machine learning, and many e-mail filters use Bayesian approaches to 
identifying spam (Graham, 2004; Sahami, Dumais, Heckerman, & Horvitz, 1998). 
Bayesian spam filters use the relative likelihood of several identifiable words or 
character strings from training sets to score a candidate e-mail as either likely spam or 
likely nonspam. As explained in some formal detail in the appendix, it is possible to use 
more than one data source in Bayesian classification (in spam filtering, multiple words). 
If one assumes that all data sources are independent of each other, then one calculates 
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likelihood ratios and the classification comes from the product of a prior odds judgment 
(e.g., a professional evaluative judgment) with all of the likelihood ratios. Though an 
assumption of independence wreaks havoc with point estimates of most statistical 
inferences, there is considerable reason to believe that the yes/no decisions of a so-
called naïve Bayesian classifier are not damaged much by an incorrect independence 
assumption (Domingos & Pazzani, 1997; Hand & Yu, 2001; Lewis, 1998; Rish, 2001; 
Zhang, 2001). Despite the research on the robustness of naïve Bayesian classifiers and 
the relative simplicity of calculation, they are not used in critical-decision frameworks 
where they could be of use, such as medical diagnoses. Recent research in medical 
diagnosis generally uses more complex Bayesian classifiers, which suggests that they can 
be substantially superior to more traditional diagnosis scoring methods (e.g., Biagioli, 
Scolletta, Cevenini, Barbini, Giomarelli, & Barbini, 2006).  
Salient Data and Likelihood Functions 
While Bayesian reasoning allows one to create a “use it or lose it” approach to 
evaluation in theory, that potential does not guarantee a practical “use it or lose it” 
algorithm. The utility of any such Bayesian system of evaluation depends on 
characteristics assumed in the prior section: the existence both of data and likelihood 
functions salient to the judgment of professional effectiveness. The limited curriculum 
coverage inherent in any test or assessment system is well-known (e.g., Dorn, 2007; 
Koretz, 2008), but to some extent, the use of likelihood functions in such a system 
would make the technical requirement of data use a little looser than the debates over 
test score use might lead one to believe. First, the explicit inclusion of professional 
judgment and the relationship between strength of judgment and influence over 
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posterior odds (explained in the prior section) reduce the reliance on circumscribed 
sources of data. Second, likelihood functions could be constructed that accommodate 
measurement error; one category of candidate for such accommodation is the set of 
kernel likelihood functions (e.g., the likelihood of observing a datum plus or minus the 
measurement error, or a distributional likelihood of being observed at a certain 
percentile rank plus or minus a decile).7
It is thus the combination of data and likelihood function that needs to be salient 
to personnel evaluation, and the choice of a likelihood function for a specific source of 
data entails value judgments about our categorical judgments of effectiveness. Consider 
the type of judgment involved in the two choices about proficiency measures mentioned 
earlier—having an exact proportion of students judged proficient (or a kernel measure 
centered on an exact proportion) versus having that proportion of students or higher 
judged proficient. Identifying either an exact or a kernel measure as important implies 
that the precise place of student measures is more important to the judgment of 
effectiveness than a broad category such as “50% or more” and that distinguishing 
groups of students with 50% proficiency from all groups with 50% or greater proficiency 
is important in evaluation policy.
  
8
In addition to the choices of data and likelihood functions, one would need to 
identify an appropriate source of distribution for any likelihood function and a 
 Either is a defensible position, but the consequences 
of the choices lead in different directions.  
                                                   
7 Domingos and Pazzani (1997) suggest dividing real-valued variables into five to ten bins, but the 
practical difference between a kernel and a quintile- or decile-based approach is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
8 I assume here that proficiency is a meaningful construct. While the construct of proficiency depends on 
the validity of cut scores, which are always arbitrary (Glass, 1978), one could make the same argument as 
in the text with any ordinal measure chosen for the task at hand.  
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defensible categorization of data into the relevant bins. The assumption in the Bayesian 
reasoning presented above is that there already is a classification of teachers into 
different categories and an existing and known distribution of the data for each 
category. In reality, any chosen distribution is likely to depend on tentative proxy 
judgments: we tentatively divide a set of teachers into categories and use a sampled 
distribution of data on those teachers to create the likelihood functions. The political 
legitimacy of those proxy judgments and comparable samples would depend on the 
classification method. The tentative classification by administrators and teachers would 
be most acceptable in a political sense, but the consequences of such classification are 
also likely to make the task aversive for many who might be asked to participate.9
Bayesian Reasoning and Additive Point Systems 
 While 
relatively simple in concept, the implementation of a Bayesian approach to evaluation 
involves both technical and political judgments.  
The political benefit of a Bayesian approach is the possible construction of an 
evaluation system where professional judgment has a “use it or lose it” trait. That 
benefit is transferrable to an additive point system, with some restrictions on the 
structure of a point system. A point system with rigid weights or rigid maximums for the 
contribution of different components will not have the benefit of a Bayesian approach. A 
point system with more flexible relationships between different components can have 
                                                   
9 Waving away the comparable-population question, one could predict a low response rate for teachers 
asked to judge the effectiveness of current peers in their schools, even if they are promised that their 
judgments would not affect personnel evaluation of their current peers for that year: their judgments 
would set the classifications used in later years and thus they would be responsible for setting the 
likelihood functions by which they and peers would be judged, at least in part.  
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the benefit of a Bayesian approach, and it is possible to construct a point system that is 
equivalent to a naïve Bayesian classifier. While the Bayesian equivalent point system is 
theoretical rather than a likely practice, the existence of an equivalent suggests what is 
necessary for a point system to capture the political benefit of a Bayesian approach. 
Bayesian Equivalents in Additive Point Systems 
As explained in the appendix, the conversion of a naïve Bayesian classifier to an 
additive point system requires a logarithmic transformation of the classifier’s product of 
factors, a log transformation that creates a sum of log odds and log likelihood ratios. In 
theory, each contribution could be calculated based on the same likelihood ratios as 
described earlier, with a positive log likelihood ratio increasing the posterior odds of a 
target decision and a negative log likelihood ratio decreasing the posterior odds of a 
target decision. To preserve the equivalent reciprocal relationship among components, 
each component in the Bayesian equivalent point system must be unbounded on both 
the positive and negative ends. A strong prior statement in a Bayesian system is 
equivalent to a log odds further from 0 (either positive or negative) than any other 
component in a point system, and at least in theory, a point system can capture the 
political benefits of a Bayesian approach to evaluation.  
Rigid Point Systems 
In contrast to the point equivalent of a Bayesian approach, a point system with 
rigidly-bounded or –weighted components fails to capture the political benefits of a 
Bayesian approach to evaluation. In a point system with bounded components, there is 
no reciprocation among the components. The effective power of a set of judgments by 
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professionals is entirely independent of the effective power of any other component. No 
matter how forceful or weak the judgment of an administrator or peer committee, the 
authority of all other components remain the same. Or, in practical terms, if the 
judgment of a principal is worth 50% of the potential points and most teachers receive 
identical scores, the influence of data remains the same as when a principal gives a 
range of scores to teachers. If evaluators responsible for one component of a point 
system are hesitant to make forceful judgments about weak teachers, other components 
do not become more important in compensation. If one believes in the abstract value of 
a particular component at the precise weight contained in a system, the advantage of 
such an approach is precisely the rigid authority of its components. However, such a 
rigid system depends heavily on the value judgments made in its construction and is 
unable to provide either type of assurance that would address the trust/mistrust 
dynamics in the debate over teacher evaluation.  
 Intermediate Options 
However, a point-based system does not need to have fixed weights for 
component scales. With the removal of rigid bounds and weights from a point system, it 
is possible to capture the political benefit of a Bayesian approach to evaluation. If the 
weight for a component scale can vary, then one could introduce a reciprocal 
relationship between professional (supervisory and peer) judgments, on the one hand, 
and other sources of evaluative information such as student outcomes, on the other. The 
most important potential benefit of a Bayesian approach to evaluation is the political 
consequences of combining professional judgment and data in a way that gives more 
authority to professionals who are willing to make forceful judgments with the 
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possibility of reciprocal authority for data when professionals are not willing to make 
forceful judgments. The practicality, advantages, and disadvantages of each approach 
described below will vary, and the purpose of describing some options is less to advocate 
for a particular approach than to illustrate a minimal range of approaches to point-
based evaluation systems.  
Weighting by component range. One such system would be a weighting of 
components by range, a literal “use it or lose it” formula. If a qualitative evaluation is 
worth up to half of the total points, but a set of evaluative ratings only spans half of the 
potential range, a “use it or lose it” policy could expand the weight of student-outcome 
data to fill the extra 25% of points not in the range of the qualitative evaluations. Such a 
system would be simple to explain and implement. It would also impose odd incentives 
to game the system, whereby a principal can insulate highly-rated teachers from the 
effect of test scores by giving extremely low ratings to a small number of teachers in a 
school.  
Standardizing ratings by a central dispersion measure. A second approach 
would be an indirect reweighting by the transformation of both test-score data and 
professional evaluative ratings into standardized scores, in comparison to a central 
dispersion measure such as a standard deviation (within a relevant population). 
Suppose that the influence of professional evaluative ratings were set at twice the weight 
of ratings derived from test scores, after both are transformed into standard-deviation 
units. In a unit where administrators (or administrators and teachers, with peer review) 
provide a range of ratings to teachers, the extreme-valued ratings will be more 
influential than test scores, at both the high and low ends. On the other hand, if the 
professional evaluative ratings have no variation—where a standardized rating would be 
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in the middle for all—then the test scores determine the end distribution. 
Administrators (and peers) could choose not to exercise their professional judgment in 
rating teachers, but such a choice would give compensatory authority to student 
outcome data.  
Overdetermined total. A third approach could be a point system that 
theoretically overdetermines outcomes, with more than 100% of the potential range 
covered by the sum of components. For example, if professional judgment evaluation 
scores are worth 50 points, and data from student outcomes are worth 50 points, the 
range of the sum is 0 to 100. But if the range of sum scores is restricted to [20,80], each 
component’s potential range spans 62.5% of the range for the total. The rationale for 
such a system would be that a system does not need to worry about extreme values that 
represent consistency between qualitative and quantitative sources of data: a teacher 
with high ratings in all categories is presumed to be highly performing, while a teacher 
with low ratings in all categories is presumed to be low-performing. It is in the middle of 
the range where the overdetermined sum has effect. 
Conclusion 
With the decision of the Obama administration to condition Race to the Top 
funds on the elimination of barriers to linking teacher and student test data, the weight 
of the U.S. political system is shifting towards linking teacher evaluations to test-
outcome data. Some part of the policy discussion is focused on performance-pay policies 
and attendant choices, but the root importance of such a linkage is with regard to 
employment rather than pay: to what extent should teachers’ jobs depend on test-score 
and other student outcome data?  
USE IT OR LOSE IT, 21 
 
This is not a new discussion, and the tensions involved in these policy debates 
will remain. Many teachers, administrators, and parents will oppose policies that place 
test scores in a dominant position, because they see tests as highly flawed and creating 
perverse incentives. School critics (including many parents) will oppose policies that 
result in uniform satisfactory evaluations for almost all teachers and see test-score use 
as an imperfect but justifiable tool to change evaluation practices. Without intervention, 
the likely outcome of these debates is a dichotomy of policies, with some school systems 
and states experimenting with crude uses of test-score data and other systems and states 
refusing to change, pointing to the inevitable problems with crude evaluation 
mechanisms.  
This paper points in a different direction, using a Bayesian inference mechanism 
as a starting point. The description of unconventional algorithmic options is less to 
advocate for any of these approaches than to illustrate potential: one may be able to 
translate the most politically-valuable characteristic of a Bayesian approach to simpler 
algorithms, or at least algorithms that can be understood by a broad group of 
stakeholders. While one may not see formal Bayesian reasoning in personnel evaluation 
systems, there are some important lessons to take from the Bayesian approach and the 
parallel between the log transformation of conditional probability equations, on the one 
hand, and additive point systems, on the other. Most importantly, the political benefits 
from a Bayesian approach requires conscious construction in a point-based system of 
evaluation. While a Bayesian calculation of posterior odds explicitly creates a reciprocal 
relationship between prior odds and likelihood ratios, a point-based system with fixed 
weights/component contributions removes that reciprocal relationship. Adjusting 
weights, the use of standard-deviation-adjusted ratings, or overdetermined point 
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systems are three methods to construct such reciprocal relationships, and it might be of 
significant benefit to explore such approaches. 
While one probably could construct an evaluation system based entirely on a 
Bayesian approach, that is not necessary to gain the most important benefits: a range of 
technical solutions that provides reasonable incentives for all parties and a starting 
point for further development and local negotiations. Many teachers unions are unlikely 
to accept the use of test scores unless it is subservient to professional judgment, but 
other stakeholders are unlikely to accept the dominance of professional judgment 
without a backup method of evaluating teachers when the professional judgment is 
timid in judging weak teachers. A “use it or lose it” approach to professional judgment is 
a workable approach rooted in a Bayesian approach to inductive reasoning and with a 
few possible constructions within a point-based evaluation system.  
 
Appendix 
The relative-odds formulation of the Bayes theorem is the standard beginning 
point for naïve Bayesian classification, if one looks at relative odds of two possibilities A 
and B and considers them to be possible decisions. Let A be the need to intervene to 
help a poor teacher and B be nonintervention.10
                                                   
10 The categories need not be exclusive: One could create additional categories such as recognition for 
merit, or dismissal, though the translation into an additive point system has difficulties with more than 
two categories.  
 Then the relative odds of needing 
intervention versus nonintervention are 
 (2), 
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where the first term on the right-hand side represents the prior relative odds of needing 
intervention and the second term is the relative likelihood of x given the two 
classifications under consideration (or likelihood ratio). One could reasonably interpret 
the first term as the judgment of relative need for intervention before gathering data {x} 
and the second term as the relative likelihood of seeing the data under those relative 
judgments. If one had distributional information about {x} for teachers needing and not 
needing supervisory intervention, where the data {x} and the framing of the likelihood 
function were professionally salient (a question discussed below), then equation (2) 
allows one to adjust one’s prior professional judgment by relevant data.11
                                                   
11 The question of appropriate data is discussed below. 
 
In the cases of updating an administrator’s initial professional judgment with 
data, the likelihood ratio is the key datum. In the case where the likelihood of data under 
condition A (intervention) is 6% and the likelihood of seeing the data under condition B 
(non intervention) is 1%, the likelihood ratio is . The posterior (after-data-
gathering) odds of needing intervention then become  , or a 90% posterior 
probability of needing remediation. But the data can also bump the prior judgment in 
the other direction. If 6% of teachers judged as needing remediation produce the data 
gathered but 8% of teachers judged as not needing remediation also produce the data 
gathered, the likelihood ratio is . The posterior (after-data-gathering) odds 
of needing intervention then become  , or an only slightly greater than even 
odds (approximately 53% probability) of needing intervention. 
USE IT OR LOSE IT, 24 
 
Multiple Data Sources and Naïve Bayesian Classifiers 
Consider first a Bayesian mechanism for adjusting professional judgment by two 
data sources rather than one, {x} and {y}. Then the posterior odds become 
, (3) 
which would require computational estimation of the likelihood ratios for 
interdependent data.12
A log transformation of equation (5) leads directly to a point-like system, 
 However, if {x} and {y} are independent, the last term becomes 
 and  
 (4) 
or, more generally, with {xi} for n independent variables,  
 (5). 
The concept here is that with a set of independent variables, or a series of data sources, 
one can repeatedly update the original professional judgment using the likelihood ratios 
of the different sources of data. The independence of the data sources is not an 
assumption likely to hold for most data sources in schools, but the simplified construct 
enables a direct comparison to point-based systems of evaluation, and there is some 
reason to believe that classifying algorithms are less vulnerable to inapt independence 
assumptions than real-valued estimators are (Domingos & Pazzani, 1997; Hand & Yu, 
2001; Lewis, 1998; Rish, 2001; Zhang, 2001). 
Log Transformation and Additive Points  
                                                   
12 Empirical Bayes estimation of the last term’s quantities (likelihood of observing one variable given a 
prior and another variable) commonly involves Monte Carlo simulation using a Gibbs sampler. This paper 
is designed to provide a simpler introduction to the issues involved and assumes the identification of 
independent variables.  
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 (6) 
and if H= , , and , then equation (6) becomes 
 (7), 
which corresponds to an additive point-based system where a classification cutoff score 
for H corresponds to log relative posterior odds,  is the log odds of professional 
judgment for two categories, and each  is the log of a likelihood ratio estimated 
from {xi}.  
The transformation of a Bayesian updating system into a linear point-based 
system is not a statement that all point-based systems have an underlying Bayesian 
equivalent. The requirements here are steep: the correspondence of the first component 
to log prior odds (the qualitative professional judgment), the correspondence of 
additional components to a set of n independent sources {xi} (or a single data source 
{x}) and salient likelihood functions, and a cutoff score representing the relative odds at 
which a decision is appropriate. While it is possible to construct a point system in this 
manner (or to infer hypothetical, latent variables that operate in the way described 
here), the point of this exercise is not to suggest the construction of an explicit Bayesian-
justified point system. Instead, the parallel can be a tool to explore the characteristics of 
any point-based system. 
Weights. First, consider a set of weights {wi} for {hi}, such that . 
Transforming this weighted linear formula back into equation (5), one can see that 
, (8) 
USE IT OR LOSE IT, 26 
 
where the weights {wi} become exponents for each data source’s likelihood ratio. The 
consequence of exponential weights in equation (8) is partly dependent on the range of 
likelihood ratio for each source {xi} and also partly dependent on the threshold value of 
 that would trigger a decision. If either the threshold value of the posterior 
odds is close to 1 or the likelihood ratio for a source xi is close to 1, the exponential place 
of wi becomes less consequential. The parallel in a weighted point system is similar: the 
weights for different components will not act in a linear fashion, but the effect of weights 
will depend on the implicit sensitivity of the threshold value for H and the range for 
each hi. A threshold value for H that easily triggers a decision and restricted ranges for 
{hi} are associated with minimal effects of weights, while broad ranges for {hi} and 
classifications of H imply a highly nonlinear effect of weighting.13
Multidimensional scales. The consequences of multidimensional components 
follow from the nonlinear consequence of weighting. The concern about implicitly 
multidimensional scales for many measurement researchers is construct validity, but 
that may be less important in a type of evaluation that its designers intended to combine 
different types of sources. On the other hand, a multidimensional scale (or component 
of a point system) effectively sets weights for each dimension in ways that are not 
deliberate. A similar conclusion follows for sources of data that are not truly 
independent of each other. To the extent that a subset of variables {xi} underlying {hi} is 
not independent, collinear components of the subset of variables could be interpreted as 
a smaller set of variables that are differentially weighted. For example, if xj and xk are 
  
                                                   
13 There is a similar effect of broad ranges in point-based grading systems. If the range for a course’s 
component is on the order of the point range for a single grade, extreme values for a single assignment 
can shift a term grade by a letter grade, and that is equivalent to a nonlinear consequence of the 
assignment on the relative that a student will earn one grade as opposed to another.  
USE IT OR LOSE IT, 27 
 
linearly dependent so that xk= Kxj, one could replace xj and xk with (K+1)·xj, and K+1 
operates as a weight with the consequences described above.  
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